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Russia claims to be an active mediator in the Middle East.  To what degree is this true 
and what do Moscow’s actions tell us about its regional objectives?  Russia’s policies 
are easily enumerated in the following Russian initiatives:
•  Russia has sold conventional weapons to Algeria, Syria, and Iran and offered them to 
other states, e.g. Libya and Jordan. Although Moscow denies it, many of these weapons 
sold to Syria and Iran have then gone to Hezbollah.
•  Russia still defends Iran against the West and opposes severe sanctions, despite 
Iran’s uranium enrichment program and its continued defiance of the UN.  Despite the 
claim in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, as of 2003, Iran was not 
building a warhead, the evidence strongly suggests that Iran indeed is building a 
nuclear weapon. Iran’s new generation advanced centrifuges have begun producing 
small quantities of uranium hexafluoride that can be used to make the fissile core of 
nuclear warheads, although  first it must be enriched to weapons grade uranium through 
a centrifuge cascade. (1) Israeli reports charge that Russia also has sold Iran low-
enriched uranium by means of nuclear fuel rods.  According to this source, Israeli and 
American sources agree that this low-enriched uranium can be transformed into 
plutonium in a nuclear reactor; this process will enable Iran to have the possibility of 
building a nuclear bomb if it can reprocess plutonium and do so without provoking a 
crisis with the IAEA. (2)
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Meanwhile, Moscow recently announced an enhancement of its relationship with Iran 
and claimed that it has averted imposing truly serious sanctions upon Iran in the newest 
UN resolution.  Moscow justifies its stance by invoking the NIE’s claim that Iran had 
stopped working on a nuclear warhead in 2003, even though enrichment goes forward. 
(3) Moscow is utilizing the NIE to undermine US threat perceptions and justifications for 
a European missile defense system. The publication of the NIE’s key judgments allows 
Russia to pursue an Iran policy that evidently is driven more by anti-Americanism and a  
desire for both great power standing and allies in the Middle East than by a realistic 
assessment of Iran’s potential threat. (4)
Indeed, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the NIE to say that Russia has no 
evidence that Iran was conducting research for a nuclear military program before or 
after 2003. (5) More bizarrely, he stated that US missile defense plans for Eastern 
Europe not only aim at deterring Russia, they also aim to replace Iran’s government. (6) 
Even though Moscow urges Iran to cease enrichment and to heed the mandate of the 
IAEA, it still falsely claims that Tehran already is undertaking such cooperation. Lavrov 
also complains that the West’s refusal to acknowledge Iran’s positive gestures towards 
the IAEA is bringing about an isolation and estrangement of Iran that hinders 
clarification and resolution of issues pertaining to its nuclear program. (7) Therefore, 
while Iran allegedly is ready to clarify all issues to the IAEA, the IAEA must be able to 
broaden its activities without outside pressure, even though Iran has deceived it 
regularly. (8)
According to President Putin, Russia and Iran are increasing cooperation.  Lavrov 
reportedly offered Iran a strategic partnership in November 2007 that would include 
lifting of all sanctions, prevention of new ones, a treaty on arms sales, plus cooperation 
in economics, energy, and even space.  Such partnership would mean that Russia 
views any encroachment on Iran’s interests as constituting an encroachment upon its 
own interests. (9) Lavrov even has argued repeatedly that “Iran deserves to be an equal 
partner of all regional countries in the resolution of the problems of the Near and Middle 
East.” (10) He also has proposed Iran’s similar involvement in Black Sea security 
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issues! (11) Additionally, Moscow has resurrected its long-standing Soviet proposal for a 
Persian Gulf security organization that debars the use of force, shows respect for 
members’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, adheres to peaceful forms of conflict 
resolution, and which would be open to foreign governments.  Despite its own arms 
sales, Russia cites the need for regional arms control and the fight against international 
terrorism.  According to Russia’s proposal, this “collective security system” also would 
help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. (12)
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov recently indicated that Moscow is 
resubmitting not only Iran’s, but also Pakistan’s bid for membership in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO).  This last point, concerning Pakistan, marks a new 
departure and a concession to China, as well.  Presumably the quid pro quo would be 
Chinese support for Iranian, and maybe Indian membership. (13) Similarly Nikolai 
Bordyuzha, Director of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO-Moscow’s 
defense alliance in Central Asia) has urged that Iran be invited to join the CSTO, giving 
it a voice in the defense of Central Asia under Russian supervision.  Moreover, should 
Washington use force against Iran then that, in turn, would threaten security in Central 
Asia. (14)
Despite its denials, Russia also is upgrading the quality of its arms sales to Iran, hinting 
broadly at forthcoming sales of S-300 anti-air missile defense systems, on top of prior 
sales of the TOR-1 missile defense system (which would serve to complicate any 
foreign air strikes on Iran). Discussions are underway about leasing modified KA-32 
helicopters and selling the RD-33 engine for Iranian fighters, so that they could power 
supersonic fighter jets, which Iran developed to replace an earlier generation of US F-5 
models.  These deliveries supposedly will “strengthen stability in the region.” (15) 
Russia further claims that Iran is not an “outcast,” but a perfectly normal state, so there 
is no reason why it should not sell Iran “defensive” weapons.  Mikhail Dmitriyev, Director 
of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, claims that if Moscow does 
not sell Iran arms, then other states will. Thus, Russia will be ousted from that market. 
(16) In other words, if Russia stops selling Iran weapons, then Iran will make a deal with 
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America, and Washington will supplant Russia in Iran’s arms market.  Indeed, Russia 
needs arms sales to Iran, because in 2007 it suffered major reverses: Chinese 
purchases fell, Algeria revoked its contracts with Moscow, and much publicized delays 
occurred in naval arms sales to India. The strong appreciation of the ruble against the 
dollar and 12% inflation in 2007, combined to make Russia’s 2007 sales appear 
stronger than they actually were. (17)
As part of its policy to gain nuclear footholds throughout the Middle East, Moscow has 
begun sending nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor, claiming that because Iran is buying 
this fuel and is supposed to return spent fuel to Russia, Iran has no “objective need” for 
generating its own nuclear fuel or for enriching uranium.  Even so, Iran merely pockets 
the fuel and moves forward. (18) And, as Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni notes, these 
actions are “inconceivable,” given Iran’s threat to Russia and all the former Soviet 
republics. (19) Still more incredible is the fact that Russian military leaders cite Iran’s 
program to develop intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as a threat to Russian 
security, thereby justifying threats to withdraw from the INF Treaty (Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces), while Russia continues to give Iran all of this support. (20) After Iran tested an 
IRBM in February 2008, Lavrov disingenuously complained that, “We don’t approve of 
Iran’s continuously demonstrating its intentions to develop its missile industry and 
continue uranium enrichment. … From the point of view of international law, these 
activities aren’t forbidden.  However, it’s necessary to take into account that the past 
years have shown a number of problems related to Iran’s nuclear program.” (21) 
•  Meanwhile, Moscow also has offered thirteen other Arab states nuclear reactors to 
allay their fears about Iran’s intentions. (22)
•  Russia promotes the formation of a gas cartel that Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
Algeria might join, and Iranian leaders have supported this action.  Putin has advocated 
such a cartel since 2002, when he proposed a Russian-dominated CIS gas cartel, and 
this goal subsequently has driven Russian gas policy in the CIS. (23) In 2006, Putin 
reiterated this initiative, calling for an “energy club” at the annual SCO summit, where 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seconded his remarks. (24) Indeed, 
Ahmadinejad’s support for close cooperation in the “gas sphere” was part of a readiness 
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to “cooperate closely” with Russia in Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus.” (25) Iranian politicians welcome a cartel because it could provide a more 
enduring basis for consolidating a longer-lasting Russo-Iranian political relationship to 
support Iran’s nuclear program against America and Europe. (26) 
•  Russia steadfastly supports Syria against UN efforts to investigate and censure 
Damascus for supporting the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri.  Russia’s support for Syria’s suzerainty over Lebanon perpetuates Lebanon’s 
divisions, precludes its real statehood, and renders it a haven for terrorists, whose 
presence generates war with Israel and benefits Iran.  Despite Lebanese pleas to 
Moscow to use its influence to persuade Syria to stop interfering in Lebanon’s domestic 
affairs, that outcome is unlikely. (27) Indeed, Lavrov recently hypocritically (and 
somewhat illogically) urged Syria to assume responsibility for Lebanon’s internal 
situation, as a means of ensuring Lebanese stability and independence. (28)
•  Russia’s overall policy toward Syria is complex.  On the one hand, it shields Syria 
from outside pressure regarding Lebanon and support for Hezbollah.  On the other 
hand, Russian diplomats evidently have been acting as couriers and possibly mediators 
for some time, bringing messages back and forth from Jerusalem to Damascus.  While 
the content of these messages remains unknown, apparently Russia is laying the 
groundwork for another Middle East peace conference, which would take place in 
Moscow and focus on the issue of making peace between Israel and Syria, as well as 
resolving the Lebanon issue among Beirut, Jerusalem, and Damascus. Israeli officials 
regard this plan as a slippery slope that would distract the parties from the key issue, 
which they believe to be peace with the Palestinians. (29) Russian media claim that it 
was Russian diplomacy that first launched the idea of a large Middle Eastern peace 
conference like the one in Annapolis in November 2007, and further that Russian 
emissaries (namely Yevgeni Primakov and Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Saltanov) 
were responsible for putting the issue of peace between Israel and Syria on the agenda 
and getting Saudi Arabian and Syrian envoys to come to Annapolis. (30) 
•  Russian officials apparently believe that being Syria’s patron demonstrates Moscow’s 
relevance to the Middle East as an indispensable great power and confirms its 
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possession of levers that could advance the peace process along with Russian political, 
economic, and strategic interests in the region. (31) Certainly, Russia’s political links to 
Syria are increasing its economic ties and investments there. (32)
•  Russia also has proposed its own version of Palestinian unity: calling on Hamas to 
support the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas, while dealing openly with 
Hamas; and advocating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the Palestinian Authority 
and simultaneously Hamas’ participation in negotiations with Israel. (33) Russia urges 
that neither side engage in violence and views its relations with Israel as an important 
precondition for success in stabilizing the region. (34)
•  Russia has intensified contacts with, and presumably recruitment or penetration within 
the Palestinian security services.  Obviously, Moscow seeks a permanent voice and 
influence within those organizations and the larger Palestinian movement.  Apparently, 
this is meant to compensate for Washington’s exclusion of Moscow from Iraq.
•  Russia’s Navy is reconstituting the old Soviet Mediterranean naval Eskadra 
(Squadron) that operated permanently in the Eastern Mediterranean.  Thus, Syria’s 
base at Tartus figures again in future Russian strategy. (35)
•  Russia wants America to set a date for leaving Iraq. (36) More broadly, this accords 
with Russia’s efforts to enhance the UN’s role in Iraq and to limit America’s ability to act. 
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, we have seen a consistent Russian effort to elevate 
the UN as the ultimate authority of Iraq’s destiny.  Yet Russia has little to show for its 
efforts to obtain energy contracts, influence over Iraq’s future disposition, or markets for 
arms sales.  Thus, it is not surprising that Putin now says that differences among states 
over Iraq should remain in the past. (37) Russian observers portray the US invasion of 
Iraq as exemplifying America’s disregard for the UN and Russia, as well as its readiness 
to use force in violation of international law and norms. Russia’s policies aim to reduce 
Washington’s opportunities for disregarding Russian interests. (38) Therefore, Moscow 
argues that America must be resisted through multipolar avenues like coalitions of 
states and by reinstalling the UN as the sole legitimate arbiter of the decision to use 
force in cases other than self-defense. (39)
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This policy is not altruistic.  Russia’s leadership seems to covet equal status with the US 
and, at one point, considered excluding other states to achieve this status. A foreign 
policy think tank close to the Russian Administration produced a 2004 strategy for 
Russo-American relations, which called for a strategic objective of a US-Russian 
alliance where Russia would receive the status of non-NATO ally equal to that of South 
Korea, Australia, and Israel.  It formulated scenarios in which Russia and America alone 
would set up jointly recognized criteria for the permissive use of force, including 
preemptive strikes when the Security Council is blocked.  Russia would obtain 
recognition of its priority in the CIS, including US help for protecting Russian minority 
rights in the Baltic states, and Russia would be invited to participate in a program of 
close cooperation to revitalize Iraq’s economy, infrastructure, health, education, and 
military forces, along with “maximum consideration to the interests of Russian oil 
companies in the development of Iraqi energy resources.” This would ensure “close 
cooperation of a future Iraqi government export oil policy with the Russian Federation.”  
According to this document, Russia also would have been invited to participate in a 
Persian Gulf security system.  Agreement would have been sought with Washington not 
to obstruct the participation of Russian energy companies in Iran (including nuclear 
energy); neither would Washington object to certain kinds of conventional arms sales to 
Iran which, of course, would be guaranteed rights to a full nuclear fuel cycle. (40)
Obviously, Washington could not even dream of accepting this program. Therefore, the 
strategy paper envisions that Russia would engage other states and would act 
unilaterally to constrain US options in the Middle East. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that Lavrov warned in May 2005 that if thwarted in Iraq, Russia would seek to enhance 
its interests throughout the Middle East, most notably in the Palestinian-Israeli process 
and the overall Arab-Israeli peace process. (41)
•  Russia refuses to enter what it falsely claims is a US-inspired war of civilizations or 
holy alliance against Islam. (42)
•  Finally, Russia strongly opposes any policy of democracy promotion in the Middle 
East.
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While some of these initiatives might amount to the outlines of a coherent policy, taken 
together they are inherently contradictory.  Russia opposes proliferation, yet refuses to 
end its own program with Iran and offers other regional governments nuclear 
technology.  It advocates Palestinian unity, peace, and stability around Israel, yet arms 
the very forces that would reignite armed conflict there. Meanwhile, it champions Syria, 
a state that has shown neither any public interest in peace, nor in withdrawing from 
Lebanon. It has no solution for Iraq, but insists that Washington leave with no plan for 
the future. Russia apparently wants to play on both sides of every local issue, but to 
what purpose? There is no discernible future vision of the Middle East in Russia’s policy. 
These contradictions can be resolved only by recognizing that Russia’s Middle East 
policy serves its extra-regional interests, not a vision of regional order.  Moscow’s 
policies here aim not at a coherent regional order, but rather to serve its larger global 
interests: constraining American power, enhancing Russian power and wealth (e.g., 
through a gas cartel and arms sales), and demonstrating that Russia is a great power 
that must be included in the resolution of issues in a region that its current leaders (and 
its Soviet predecessors) view as an area where its vital interests are engaged.
Viewed in this light, Russian policy makes more sense; it demonstrates that Russia has 
no compelling reason to espouse a vision of Middle East order. Instead, Russia’s status 
and power must be acknowledged and constantly engaged in regional events, while the 
projection of American power into the region is constrained, limited, and frustrated.  
Managed instability, possibly the most one can hope for, suits Russia because it then 
can maximize its presence and influence through energy and arms sales.  Moscow also 
resists any enlargement of the democratic sphere in the Middle East, lest it generate 
reverberations in and around the CIS or Russia itself. 
Thus, Russia is busily creating tactical alliances with Arab states and engaging with 
Israel, even though these tactical relationships add up to a regionally inconsistent 
strategy.  What matters to Russia is that it continues to be a player in the game, not 
resolving issues.  As long as this managed instability can continue without further wars 
or third party nuclear proliferation, Moscow happily will exploit it by using its great power 
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diplomacy, maneuvering in the UN, and utilizing arms sales, energy, and economic 
activities to prevent Washington from organizing a pro-American bloc in the region.  
Obviously, the key state for Russia in this policy and strategy is Iran.  And with Iran 
comes Syria, Iran’s partner and the recipient of Russian arms, bought on credit (despite 
Russian claims that it would no longer engage in such practices and could not afford to 
do so).  Syria’s example evidently is a precedent.  Moscow also seeks permanent 
economic niches and markets in Gulf countries and the broader Middle East, through 
arms sales and the provision of nuclear power to gain influence and counter Iran.
Frankly, Russian interests suffer when there is Western-led movement towards 
resolution of any of these conflicts or a change within the Arab states in a democratic 
direction.  Likewise, Russia seemingly wants to recreate something like the Rejectionist 
Front of the late 1970s and 1980s, where it sponsored Iran, Iraq, and Syria against 
America’s Middle Eastern policies.  Obviously, Russian policy is not a prescription for 
regional stability.  Those who hope that Moscow might be a better alternative than 
Washington will be disappointed once again, if not angered, by Russia’s continuing to 
resort to traditional great power views and practices that seek to use the Middle East 
and its peoples for broader and wholly self-serving purposes.
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